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Abstract
Open-ended questions, in which participants write or type their responses, are used in many areas of the behavioral sciences.
Although effective in the lab, they are relatively untested in online experiments, and the quality of responses is largely unex-
plored. Closed-ended questions are easier to use online because they generally require only single key- or mouse-press responses
and are less cognitively demanding, but they can bias the responses. We compared the data quality obtained using open and
closed response formats using the continued-influence effect (CIE), in which participants read a series of statements about an
unfolding event, one of which is unambiguously corrected later. Participants typically continue to refer to the corrected misin-
formation when making inferential statements about the event. We implemented this basic procedure online (Exp. 1A, n = 78),
comparing standard open-ended responses to an alternative procedure using closed-ended responses (Exp. 1B, n = 75). Finally,
we replicated these findings in a larger preregistered study (Exps. 2A and 2B, n = 323). We observed the CIE in all conditions:
Participants continued to refer to the misinformation following a correction, and their references to the target misinformationwere
broadly similar in number across open- and closed-ended questions. We found that participants’ open-ended responses were
relatively detailed (including an average of 75 characters for inference questions), and almost all responses attempted to address
the question. The responses were faster, however, for closed-ended questions. Overall, we suggest that with caution it may be
possible to use either method for gathering CIE data.
Keywords Open-ended . Closed-ended . Response formats .Web-based .Misinformation . Continued influence effect
Over the past decade, many areas of research that have tradi-
tionally been conducted in the lab have moved to using Web-
based data collection (e.g., Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, &
Acquisti, 2017; Simcox & Fiez, 2014; Stewart, Chandler, &
Paolacci, 2017;Wolfe, 2017). Collecting data online has many
advantages for researchers, including ease and speed of par-
ticipant recruitment and a broader demographic of partici-
pants, relative to lab-based students.
Part of the justification for this shift has been the finding
that the data quality fromWeb-based studies is comparable to
that obtained in the lab: The vast majority of Web-based
studies have replicated existing findings (e.g., Crump,
McDonnell, & Gureckis, 2013; Germine et al., 2012; Zwaan
et al., 2017). However, the majority of these studies have been
in areas in which participants make single key- or mouse-press
responses to stimuli. Less well explored are studies using
more open-ended responses, in which participants write their
answers to questions. These types of question are useful for
assessing recall rather than recognition and for examining
spontaneous responses that are unbiased by experimenter ex-
pectations, and as such may be unavoidable for certain types
of research.
There are reasons to predict that typed responses might be
of lower quality for open-ended than for closed-ended ques-
tions. Among the few studies that have failed to replicate
online have been those that have required high levels of atten-
tion and engagement (Crump et al., 2013), and typing is both
time-consuming and more physically effortful than pointing
and clicking. Relatedly, participants who respond on mobile
devices might struggle to make meaningful typed responses
without undue effort.
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Thus, researchers who typically run their studies with
open-ended questions in the lab, and who wish to move to
running them online, have two options. Either they can retain
the open-ended question format and hope that the online par-
ticipants are at least as diligent as those in the lab, or they can
use closed-ended questions in place of open-ended questions,
but with the risk that participants will respond differently or
draw on different memory or reasoning processes to answer
the questions. We examined the relative feasibility of these
two options by using the continued-influence effect, a para-
digm that (a) is a relatively well-used memory and reasoning
task, (b) has traditionally used open-ended questions, and (c)
is one that we have experience with running in the lab.
The continued-influence effect
The continued-influence effect of misinformation refers to the
consistent finding that misinformation continues to influence
people’s beliefs and reasoning even after it has been corrected
(Chan, Jones, Hall Jamieson, & Albarracín, 2017; Ecker,
Lewandowsky, & Apai, 2011b; Ecker, Lewandowsky,
Swire, & Chang, 2011a; Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Tang,
2010; Gordon, Brooks, Quadflieg, Ecker, & Lewandowsky,
2017; Guillory &Geraci, 2016; Johnson & Seifert, 1994; Rich
& Zaragoza, 2016; Wilkes & Leatherbarrow, 1988; for a
review, see Lewandowsky, Ecker, Seifert, Schwarz, & Cook,
2012). Misinformation can have a lasting effect on people’s
reasoning, even when they demonstrably remember that the
information has been corrected (Johnson & Seifert, 1994) and
are given prior warnings about the persistence of misinforma-
tion (Ecker et al., 2010).
In the experimental task used to study the continued-
influence effect (CIE), participants are presented with a series
of 10–15 sequentially presented statements describing an
unfolding event. Target (mis)information that allows inferences
to be drawn about the cause of the event is presented early in the
sequence and is later corrected. Participants’ inferential reason-
ing and factual memory based on the event report are then
assessed through a series of open-ended questions.
For example, in Johnson and Seifert (1994), participants
read a story about a warehouse fire in which the target
(mis)information implies that carelessly stored flammable ma-
terials (oil paint and gas cylinders) are a likely cause of the
fire. Later in the story, some participants learned that no such
materials had actually been stored in the warehouse, and there-
fore that they could not have caused the fire. The ensuing
questionnaire included indirect inference questions (e.g., Bwhat
could have caused the explosions?^), as well as direct questions
probing recall of the literal content of the story (e.g., Bwhat was
the cost of the damage done?^). The responses to inference
questions were coded in order to measure whether the misin-
formation had been appropriately updated (no oil paint and gas
cylinders were present in the warehouse). The responses were
categorized according to whether they were consistent with the
explanation implied by the target (mis)information1 (e.g.,
Bexploding gas cylinders^) or were not (e.g., Belectrical short
circuit^).
In a typical CIE experiment, performance on a misinforma-
tion-followed-by-correction condition is usually compared to
one or more baselines: a condition in which the misinforma-
tion is presented but is not then retracted (no-correction
condition) or a condition in which the misinformation is never
presented (no-misinformation condition). The former control
condition allows for assessment of the retraction’s effective-
ness; the latter arguably shows whether the correction reduces
reference to misinformation to a level comparable to never
having been exposed to the misinformation (but see below).
The key finding from CIE studies is that people continue to
use the misinformation to answer the inference questions,
even though it has been corrected. The most consistent pattern
of findings is that references to previously corrected misinfor-
mation are elevated relative to a no-misinformation condition,
and are either below, or in some cases indistinguishable from,
references in the no-correction condition.
Using open- and closed-ended questions
online
With only a few exceptions (Guillory & Geraci, 2013, 2016;
Rich & Zaragoza, 2016), research concerning reliance on mis-
information has used open-ended questions administered in
the lab (see Capella, Ophir, & Sutton, 2018, for an overview
of approaches to measuring misinformation beliefs). There are
several good reasons for using such questions, particularly on
memory-based tasks that involve the comprehension or recall
of previously studied text. First, the responses to open-ended
questions are constructed rather than suggested by response
options, and so avoid bias introduced by suggesting responses
to participants. Second, open-ended questions also allow partic-
ipants to give detailed responses about complex stimuli and
permit a wide range of possible responses. Open-ended ques-
tions also resemble cued-recall tasks, which mostly depend on
controlled retrieval processes (Jacoby, 1996) and provide limited
retrieval cues (Graesser, Ozuru, & Sullins, 2010). These factors
are particularly important for memory-based tasks wherein an-
swering the questions requires the active generation of previous-
ly studied text (Ozuru, Briner, Kurby, & McNamara, 2013).
For Web-based testing, these advantages are balanced
against the potential reduction in data quality when
1 We use the term (mis)information throughout to refer to the original state-
ment presented early in a CIE study that is later corrected. We parenthesize the
(mis) because in some control conditions the information is not corrected,
meaning that it cannot be considered misinformation from those participants’
perspective.
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participants have to type extensive responses. The evidence
concerningwritten responses is mixed. Grysman (2015) found
that participants on the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT)
wrote shorter self-report event narratives than did college par-
ticipants completing online surveys, typing in the presence of
a researcher, or giving verbal reports. Conversely, Behrend,
Sharek, Meade, and Wiebe (2011) found no difference in the
amounts written in free-text responses between university-
based and AMT respondents.
A second potential effect concerns missing data:
Participants have anecdotally reported to us that they did not
enjoy typing open-ended responses. Open-ended questions
could particularly discourage participants with lower levels
of literacy or certain disabilities from expressing themselves
in the written form, which could in turn increase selective
dropout from some demographic groups (Berinsky,
Margolis, & Sances, 2014). As well as losing whole partici-
pant datasets, open-ended questions in Web surveys could
also result in more individual missing data points than
closed-ended questions do (Reja, Manfreda, Hlebec, &
Vehovar, 2003).
The alternative to using open-ended questions online is
using closed-ended questions. These have many advantages,
particularly in a context where there is less social pressure to
perform diligently. However, response options can also inform
participants about the researcher’s knowledge and expecta-
tions about the world and suggest a range of reasonable re-
sponses (Schwarz, Hippler, Deutsch, & Strack, 1985;
Schwarz, Knauper, Hippler, Neumann, & Clark, 1991;
Schwarz, Strack, Müller, & Chassein, 1988). There is also
empirical evidence to suggest that open- and closed-end re-
sponses are supported by different cognitive (Frew, Whynes,
& Wolstenholme, 2003; Frew, Wolstenholme, & Whynes,
2004) or memory (Khoe, Kroll, Yonelinas, Dobbins, &
Knight, 2000; see Yonelinas, 2002, for a review) processes.
A straightforward conversion of open- to closed-ended ques-
tions might therefore be impractical for testing novel scientific
questions in a given domain.
The latter caveat may be particularly relevant for the CIE.
Repeated statements are easier to process and are subsequent-
ly perceived as more truthful than new statements (Ecker,
Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 2011a; Fazio, Brashier,
Payne, & Marsh, 2015; Moons, Mackie, & Garcia-Marques,
2009). Therefore, repeating misinformation in the response
options could activate automatic (familiarity-based) rather
than strategic (recollection-based) retrieval of studied text,
which may not reflect how people reason about misinforma-
tion in the real world. Conversely, presenting corrections that
explicitly repeat misinformation is more effective at reducing
misinformation effects than is presenting corrections that
avoid repetition (Ecker, Hogan, & Lewandowsky, 2017). As
such, substituting closed-ended for open-ended questions
might have unpredictable consequences.
Overview of experiments
The overarching aim of the experiments reported here was to
examine open- and closed-ended questions in Web-based
memory and inference research. The more specific goals were
(1) to establish whether a well-known experimental task that
elicits responses with open-ended questions would replicate
online, and (2) to explore the feasibility of converting open-
ended questions to the type of closed-ended questions more
typically seen online. To achieve these goals, two experiments
were designed to replicate the CIE. Experiments 1A and 1B
used the same experimental stimuli and subset of questions as
in Johnson and Seifert (1994, Exp. 3A), wherein participants
read a report about a warehouse fire and answered questions
that assessed inferential reasoning about the story, factual ac-
curacy, and the ability to recall the correction or control infor-
mation (critical information). Experiments 1A and 2A
employed standard open-ended measures, whereas a closed-
ended analogue was used in Experiments 1B and 2B.
Although they are reported as separate experiments, both
Experiments 1A and 1B were run concurrently as one study,
as were Experiments 2A and 2B, with participants being ran-
domly allocated to each experiment, as well as to the experi-
mental conditions within each experiment.
Experiment 1A
Method
ParticipantsA power analysis using the effect size observed in
previous research using the same stimuli and experimental
design (Johnson & Seifert, 1994; effect size obtained from
the means in Exp. 3A) indicated that a minimum of 69 partic-
ipants were required (f = 0.39, 1–β = .80, α = .05). In total, 78
US-based participants (50 males, 28 females; between 19 and
62 years of age, M = 31.78, SD = 10.10) were recruited via
AMT. Only participants with a Human Intelligence Task
(HIT) approval rating greater than or equal to 99% were re-
cruited for the experiment, to ensure high-quality data without
having to include attentional check questions (Peer, Vosgerau,
& Acquisti, 2014). The participants were paid $2, and the
median completion time was 11 min.
Stimuli and design The experiment was programmed in
Adobe Flash (Reimers & Stewart, 2007, 2015). Participants
read one of three versions of a fictional news report about a
warehouse fire, which consisted of 15 discrete messages. The
stimuli were identical to those used in Johnson and Seifert
(1994, Exp. 3A). Figure 1 illustrates how the message content
was varied across the experimental conditions, as well as the
message presentation format. The effect of the correction infor-
mation on reference to the target (mis)information was assessed
Behav Res
between groups; participants were randomly assigned to one of
three experimental groups: no correction (n = 32), correction (n
= 21), and alternative explanation (n = 25).
The target (mis)information, implying that carelessly
stored oil paint and gas cylinders played a role in the fire,
was presented at Message 6. This information was then
corrected at Message 13 for the two conditions featuring a
correction. Information implying that the fire was actually
the result of arson (alternative explanation group) was present-
ed at Message 14; the other two experimental groups merely
learned that the storage hall contained stationery materials.
The other messages provided further details about the incident
and were identical in all three experimental conditions.
The questionnaire following the statements consisted of
three question blocks: inference, factual, and critical informa-
tion recall. The question order was randomized within the
inference and factual blocks, but not in the correction recall
block, in which the questions were presented in a predefined
order: Inference questions (e.g., BWhat was a possible cause
of the fumes^) were presented first, followed by factual ques-
tions (e.g., BWhat business was the firm in?^), and then critical
information recall questions (e.g., BWhat was the point of the
second message from Police Investigator Lucas?^).
There were three dependent measures: (1) reference to the
target (mis)information in the inference questions, (2) factual
recall, and (3) critical information recall. The first dependent
measure assessed the extent to which the misinformation influ-
enced interpretation of the news report, whereas the second
assessed memory for the literal content of the report. The final
measure specifically assessed understanding and accurate recall
of the critical information that appeared at Message 13 (see Fig.
1). Although not all groups received a correction, the partici-
pants in all experimental groups were asked these questions so
that the questions would not differ between the conditions. The
stimuli were piloted on a small group of participants to check
their average completion time and obtain feedback about the
questionnaire. Following the pilot, the number of questions in-
cluded in the inference and factual blocks was reduced from ten
to six, because participants felt some questions were repetitive.
Procedure Participants clicked on a link in AMT to enter the
experimental site. After seeing details about the experiment,
giving consent, and receiving detailed instructions, they were
told that they would not be able to backtrack and that each
message would appear for a minimum of 10 s before they
could move on to the next message.
Immediately after reading the final statement, participants
were informed that they would see a series of inference-based
questions. They were told to type their responses in the text
box provided, giving as much detail as necessary and writing
Fig. 1 The continued-influence effect task:Messages 1–5 provide general
information about the event, beginning with the fire being reported. The
target (mis)information is presented at Message 6 and is then corrected,
for correction and correction + alternative explanation groups, atMessage
13. The correction + alternative explanation group then receive informa-
tion providing a substitute account of the fire to Bfill the gap^ left by
invalidating the misinformation. This condition usually leads to a robust
reduction in reference to the misinformation
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in full sentences; that they should write at least 25 characters
to be able to continue to the next question; and that they
should answer questions on the basis of their understanding
of the report and of industrial fires in general. After this they
were informed that they would answer six factual questions,
which then followed. Next, participants were instructed to
answer the two critical information recall questions on the
basis of what they remembered from the report. After com-
pleting the questionnaire, participants were asked to provide
their sex, age, and highest level of education.
Results
Coding of responses The main dependent variable extracted
from responses to the inference questions was Breference to
target (mis)information.^ References that explicitly stated, or
strongly implied, that oil paint and gas cylinders caused or
contributed to the fire were scored a 1; otherwise, responses
were scored as 0. Table 1 shows an example of a response that
was coded as a reference to target (mis)information and an
example of a response that was not coded as such. There were
several examples of references to flammable items that did not
count as references to the corrected information. For example,
stating that the fire spread quickly BBecause there were a lot of
flammable things in the shop^ would not be counted as a
reference to the corrected information, since there was no
specific reference to gas, paint, liquids, substances, or the fact
that they were (allegedly) in the closet. The maximum indi-
vidual score across the inference questions was 6. The re-
sponses to factual questions were scored for accuracy; correct
or partially correct responses were scored 1, and incorrect
responses were scored 0. Again, the maximum factual score
was 6. We also examined critical information recall, to check
participants’ awareness of either the correction to the misin-
formation or the control message, computed using two ques-
tions that assessed awareness and accuracy for the critical
information that appeared at Message 13. This meant that
the correct response depended on correction information con-
dition. For the participants in the no-correction group, the
correct response was that the injured firefighters had been
released from hospital, and for the two conditions featuring
a correct ion, this was a correct ion of the target
(mis)information.
Intercoder reliability All participants’ responses to the infer-
ence, factual, and correction recall questions were indepen-
dently coded by two trained coders. Interrater agreement
was .88, and Cohen’s Κ = .76 ± .02, indicating a high level
of agreement between coders; both measures are higher than
the benchmark values of .7 and .6 (Krippendorff, 2012;
Landis & Koch, 1977), respectively, and there was no system-
atic bias between raters, χ2 = 0.29, p = .59.
Inference responses The overall effect of the correction infor-
mation on references to the target (mis)information was sig-
nificant, F(2, 75) = 10.73, p < .001, ηp
2 = .22 [.07, .36].
Dunnett multiple comparison tests (shown in panel A of Fig.
2) revealed that a correction or a correction with an alternative
explanation significantly reduced reference to the target
(mis)information in response to the inference questions.
A Bayesian analysis using the BayesFactor package in
R and default priors (Morey & Rouder, 2015) was performed
to examine the relative predictive success of the comparisons
between conditions. The BF10 for the first comparison 28.93,
indicating strong evidence (Lee & Wagenmakers, 2014) in
favor of the alternative that there was a difference between
the no correction and correction groups. The BF10 for the
comparison between the no-correction and alternative-
explanation groups was 209.03, again indicating very strong
evidence in favor of the alternative. The BF10 was 0.36 for the
final comparison between the correction and alternative-
explanation groups, indicating anecdotal evidence in favor of
the null.
The Bayes factor analysis was mostly consistent with
the p values and effect sizes. Both conditions featuring
a correction led to a decrease in references to the target
(mis)information, but the data for the two conditions
featuring a correction cannot distinguish between the
null hypothesis and previous findings (i.e., that an alter-
native explanation substantially reduces reference to
misinformation, as compared to a correction alone).
Factual responses Factual responses were examined to
establish whether the differences in references to the
(mis)information could be explained by memory for the literal
content of the report. Overall, participants accurately recalled
similar numbers of correct details across the correction
information conditions (Fig. 2C), and the omnibus test was
not significant, F(2, 75) = 0.78, p = .46, ηp
2 = .02.
Response quality Participants were required to write a mini-
mum of 25 characters in response to the questions. The num-
ber of characters written was examined as a measure of re-
sponse quality. Participants wrote between 36% and 64%
more, on average, than the minimum required 25 characters
in response to the inference (M = 69.45, SD = 40.49), factual
(M = 39.09, SD = 15.85), and critical information recall (M =
Table 1 Example of response codings in Experiment 1
Question Example of a Response
Scored 1
Example of a Response
Scored 0
Why did the
fire spread
so quickly?
Fire spread quickly due to
gas cylinder explosion.
Gas cylinders were
stored inside the closet
The fire occurred in a
stationery warehouse
that housed envelopes
and bales of paper that
could easily ignite
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66.72, SD = 42.76) questions. There was—unsurprisingly—a
positive correlation between time taken to complete the study
and number of characters written, r(76) = .31, p = .007.
Experiment 1B
In Experiment 1B we examined the feasibility of converting
open-ended questions to a comparable closed-ended form.
Method
Participants Seventy-five US-based (46 male, 29 female; be-
tween 18 and 61 years of age,M = 34.31, SD = 10.54) partic-
ipants were recruited from AMT. The participants were paid
$2; the median completion time was 9 min.
Design, stimuli, and procedure Experiment 1B used the same
story/newsfeed stimuli and high-level design as Experiment
1A; participants were randomly assigned to one of three ex-
perimental conditions: no correction (n = 33), correction (n =
22), or alternative explanation (n = 20). The only difference
between the experiments was that closed-ended questions
were used in the subsequent questionnaire. Figure 3 shows
how participants had to respond to inference and factual ques-
tions. For the inferential questions, points were allocated to
response alternatives that corresponded to four possible expla-
nations. For example, when answering the question BWhat
could have caused the explosions?,^ participants could allo-
cate points to a misinformation-consistent option (e.g., BFire
came in contact with compressed gas cylinders^), an
alternative-explanation-consistent option (e.g., BSteel drums
filled with liquid accelerants^), an option that was plausible
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Exp 1B: Closed−Ended Inference Responses
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Exp 1A: Open−Ended Factual Responses
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Exp 1B: Closed−Ended Factual Responses
d
Correction Information Misinfo + No Corr. Misinfo + Corr. Misinfo + Corr. + Alt. Exp.
Fig. 2 Effects of correction information on the numbers of (A) references
to the target (mis)information in Experiment 1A, (B) references to the
target misinformation in Experiment 1B, (C) accurately recalled facts in
Experiment 1A, and (D) accurately recalled facts in Experiment 1B. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the means. The brackets
represent Dunnett’s multiple comparison tests (which account for unequal
group sizes) for significant omnibus tests. The dashed lines represent the
means after excluding participants who did not recall the critical informa-
tion (i.e., scored 0 on the first critical information recall question asking
what the point of the secondmessage from Police Investigator Lucas was)
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given the story details but that was not explicitly stated (e.g.,
BVolatile compounds in photocopiers caught on fire^), or an
option that was inconsistent with the story details (e.g.,
BCooking equipment caught on fire^).
The response options were chosen in this way to give
participants the opportunity to provide more nuanced
responses than would be possible using multiple-choice or
true/false alternatives. This approach allowed the participants
who were presented with misinformation and then a correc-
tion to choose an explanation that was consistent with the
story but did not make use of the target (mis)information. If
the CIE were observed in response to closed-ended questions,
then the number of points allocated to misinformation-
consistent options in the conditions featuring a correction
should be non-zero. The accuracy on factual questions was
measured using four-alternative forced choice multiple-choice
questions, in which participants responded by choosing the
correct answer from a set of four possible options. The order
of presentation for the response alternatives for inference and
factual questions was randomized across participants. The
critical informatin recall questions were open-ended, and par-
ticipants gave free-text responses in the same manner as
Experiment 1A.
Results
Individual inference, factual, and critical information recall
scores (an analysis of the critical information recall
responses is shown in the additional analyses in the
supplemental materials) were calculated for each participant.
Since the maximum number of points that could be allocated
to a given option explanation theme for each question was 10,
the maximum inference score for an individual participant was
60. The maximum factual score was 6, and the maximum
critical information recall score was 2. Critical information
recall questions were open-ended, and responses were coded
using the same criteria as in Experiment 1A.
Inference responses A one-way analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on reference to the target (mis)information re-
vealed a significant effect of correction information, F(2, 72)
= 9.39, p < .001, ηp
2 = .21 [.05, .35]. Overall, the pattern of
results for reference to the target (mis)information in response
to closed-ended questions was very similar to that in
Experiment 1A (Fig. 2B). Although a correction with an al-
ternative explanation significantly reduced reference to the
target (mis)information, a correction on its own did not. The
difference between the two conditions featuring a correction
was also not significant.
The BF10 was 1.02 for the first comparison, between the
no-correction and correction groups, indicating anecdotal ev-
idence in favor of the alternative, or arbitrary evidence for
either hypothesis. The BF10 was 250.81 for the second com-
parison, between the no-correction and alternative-
explanation groups, indicating strong evidence for the alterna-
tive. The BF10 was 4.22 for the final comparison, indicating
substantial evidence in favor of the alternative.
The Bayes factor analysis was mostly consistent with the p
values and effect sizes, except that the Bayes factor for the
comparison between the correction and alternative-
explanation conditions suggested an effect, whereas the p val-
ue did not.
Factual responses Analysis of the factual scores indicated a
significant difference between the correction information
groups, F(2, 72) = 5.30, p = .007, ηp
2 = .13 [.01, .26].
Figure 2D shows that the average number of factually correct
details recalled from the report was significantly lower in the
correction condition than in the no-correction group but not
than in the alternative-explanation group. The poorer overall
performance on factual questions for the correction group was
mainly attributable to incorrect responses to two questions.
The first of these questions asked about the contents of the
closet that had reportedly contained flammable materials, be-
fore the fire; the second asked about the time the fire was put
Fig. 3 Screenshots of how the inference (left) and factual (right) ques-
tions and response options were presented to participants. Participants
used the red arrow features to allocate points to the response alternatives
in response to the inference questions. The factual questions were an-
swered by selecting the Bcorrect^ option based on the information in
the report
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out. Only a third (23% in the correction and 25% in the
alternative-explanation group) answered the question about
the contents of the closet correctly (i.e., that the storeroom
was empty before the fire), whereas 86% of the no-
correction group correctly responded that oil paint and gas
cylinders were in the storeroom before the fire. This is perhaps
unsurprising: The correct answer for the no-correction condi-
tion (Bpaint and gas cylinders^) was more salient and unam-
biguous than the correct answer for the other two conditions
(BThe storage closet was empty before the fire^).
Discussion
The results for Experiments 1A and 1B suggest that both
open- and closed-ended questions can successfully be
used in online experiments with AMT to measure differ-
ences in references to misinformation in a standard
continued-influence experiment. There was a clear CIE
of misinformation in all conditions of both experi-
ments—a correction reduced, but did not come near elim-
inating, reference to misinformation in inference ques-
t ions. In both experiments, references to target
(mis)information were significantly lower in the correc-
tion + alternative than in the no-correction condition, with
the correction condition lying between those two extremes
(see Fig. 2A and B). Although the patterns of significant
results were slightly different (correction condition was
significantly below no correction in Exp. 1A but not in
Exp. 1B), this is consistent the variability seen across
experiments using the CIE, in that some researchers have
found a reduction in references to (mis)information fol-
lowing a correction (Connor Desai & Reimers, 2017;
Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Apai, 2011b; Ecker et al.,
2010), but others have found no significant reduction
(Johnson & Seifert, 1994).
With regard to motivation, we found that the vast
majority of participants wrote reasonable responses to
the open-ended questions. The answers were of a con-
siderable length for the question, with participants usu-
ally typing substantially more than the minimum num-
ber of characters required. We found that the absolute
numbers of references to the misinformation were com-
parable to those found in existing studies. That said, the
open-ended questions had to be coded by hand, and for
participants the median completion time was 18% lon-
ger in Experiment 1A (11 min) than in Experiment 1B
(9 min). This disparity in completion times only serves
to emphasize that using closed-ended questions stream-
lines the data collection process relative to open-ended
questions.
Taken as a whole, these findings show that reasonably
complex experimental tasks that traditionally require partici-
pants to construct written responses can be implemented
online using either the same type of open-ended questions or
comparable closed-ended questions.
Rationale for Experiments 2A and 2B
The results of Experiments 1A and 1B are promising with
regard to using open-ended questions in online research in
general, and to examining phenomena such as the CIE specif-
ically. However, they have some limitations. The most salient
limitation was the sample size. Although the numbers of par-
ticipants in the different conditions were comparable to those
in many lab-based studies of the CIE, the sample size was
nonetheless small. One of the advantages of using Web-
based procedures is that it is relatively straightforward to re-
cruit large numbers of participants, so in Experiments 2A and
2B we replicated the key conditions of the previous studies
with twice as many participants. We also preregistered the
method, directional hypotheses, and analysis plan (including
planned analyses, data stopping rule, and exclusion criteria)
prior to data collection; this information can be found at
https://osf.io/cte3g/.
We also used this opportunity to include a second baseline
condition. Several CIE experiments have included control
conditions in some form that makes it possible to see whether
references to the cause suggested by the misinformation fol-
lowing its correction are not only greater than zero, but greater
than the references to the same cause if the misinformation is
never presented. In this study we did not believe that such a
condition would be very informative, because the strictness of
the coding criteria meant that it would be unlikely that partic-
ipants would spontaneously suggest paint or gas cylinders as
contributing to the fire.2
Instead, Experiments 2A and 2B included a more directly
comparable control group for whom a correction was present-
ed without the initial target (mis)information. According to the
mental-model-updating account of the CIE, event information
is integrated into a mental model that is updated when new
information becomes available. Corrections may be poorly
encoded or retrieved because they threaten the model’s inter-
nal coherence (Ecker et al., 2010; Johnson & Seifert, 1994;
Johnson-Laird, 1980). If the CIE arises because of a mental-
model-updating failure, then presenting the misinformation
only as part of a correction should not result in a CIE, because
there would not be an opportunity to develop a mental model
involving the misinformation. On the other hand, participants
might continue to refer to the misinformation for more super-
ficial reasons: If the cause presented in the misinformation
2 There was also a conceptual issue concerning whether references to the cause
presented in the misinformation should be compared across correction and no-
mention conditions. In the former case, the correction ruled out the cause; in
the latter, the cause would still be possible.
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were available in memory and recalled without the context of
its being corrected, then presenting the misinformation as part
of the correction should lead to a CIE comparable to those in
other conditions.
In these experiments, we repeated the no-correction and
correction conditions from Experiments 1A and 1B. In place
of the correction + alternative condition, however, we had the
no-mention condition, which was the same as the correction
condition except that we replaced the target (mis)information
with a filler statement (BMessage 6—4:30 a.m. Message re-
ceived from Police Investigator Lucas saying that they have
urged local residents to keep their windows and doors shut^).
The wording of the correction message for this condition stat-
ed that Ba closet reportedly containing cans of oil paint and gas
cylinders had actually been empty before the fire^ rather than
referring simply to Bthe closet,^ so that the participants would
not think they had missed some earlier information.
Beyond this, the general setup for Experiments 2A and 2B
was the same as that for Experiments 1A and 1B, except in the
following respects: We included an instruction check (which
appeared immediately after the initial instructions and
immediately before the warehouse fire report was presented)
that tested participants’ comprehension of the instructions via
three multiple-choice questions. Participants were not
excluded because of this check, but they were not allowed to
proceed to the main experiment until they had answered all
three questions correctly, consistent with Crump et al.’s (2013)
recommendations. Because Adobe Flash, which we had used
for Experiments 1A and 1B, is being deprecated and is
increasingly hard to use for Web-based research, we
implemented Experiments 2A and 2B using Qualtrics, which
led to some superficial changes in the implementation. Most
notable was that the point-allocation method for closed-ended
inference questions required participants to type numbers of
points to allocate, rather than adjusting the values using
buttons.
The sample size was also doubled in this second set of
experiments.
Experiment 2A
Method
Participants In all, 157 US- and UK-based participants (91
male, 66 female; between 18 and 64 years of age, M =
33.98, SD = 10.57) were recruited using AMT.3 The median
completion time was 16 min and participants, and were paid
$1.25.4
Design and procedure Participants were randomly assigned to
one of three experimental conditions: misinformation + no
correction (n = 52), misinformation + correction (n = 52), or
no misinformation + correction (n = 53).
Results
Intercoder reliability Participants’ responses to the inference,
factual, and critical information recall 5 questions were coded
by one trained coder, and 10% (n = 16) of the responses were
independently coded by a second trained coder. The interrater
agreement was 1 and Cohen’s K = 1 ± 0, indicating, surpris-
ingly, perfect agreement between the coders.
Inference responses Participants produced similar numbers of
references to the target (mis)information across correction in-
formation conditions (Fig. 4A), and the omnibus test was not
significant, F(2, 154) = 0.62, p = .54, ηp
2 = .01 [.00, .05].
Unlike in Experiment 1A, a correction did not significantly
reduce the number of references to the target (mis)information
relative to a control group who did not receive a correction.
Moreover, participants who were not presented with the initial
misinformation but did receive a correction message, made a
number of misinformation references similar to those for par-
ticipants who were first exposed to the misinformation.
Factual responses Participants’ ability to accurately recall de-
tails from the report differed across correction information
conditions (Fig. 4C), F(2, 154) = 8.12, p < .001, ηp
2 = .10
[.02, .18]. Tukey’s test for multiple comparisons revealed that
the group who received a correction without the initial misin-
formation recalled significantly fewer details from the report
than did the group who saw the uncorrected misinformation,
but the other differences were nonsignificant, ps > .05.
Response quality Participants wrote between 48% and 69%
more, on average, than the minimum of 25 required characters
in response to the inference (M = 80.76, SD = 56.38), factual
(M = 48.15, SD = 24.86), and critical information recall (M =
75.56, SD = 47.05) questions. We found a positive correlation
between the time taken to complete the study and the number
of characters written, r(155) = .34, p < .0001, showing that the
participants who took longer wrote more.
3 Three of the participants were recruited from Prolific Academic. Data was
collected from 159 participants but two of the participants were excluded
because they gave nonsense answers to the questions (e.g., Bbecause the wind
is blow, love is fall, I think it is very interesting^).
4 Themodal completion time in Experiments 1 and 2 was below 10min, so the
fee was reduced so that participants were paid the equivalent of the federal
minimum wage in the US ($7.25).
5 Critical information recall is referred to as correction recall in the preregis-
tration document submitted for the second set of studies reported. We changed
the name of this variable to reflect the fact that a correction was not presented
in the no-correction condition.
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Experiment 2B
Method
Participants A total of 166 US- and UK-based participants
(100 male, 66 female; between 18 and 62 years of age, M =
35.04, SD = 10.36) were recruited using AMT.6 Participants
were paid $1.25; their median completion time was 13 min.
Design and procedure Experiment 2B used the same high-
level design and procedure as Experiment 2A. The responses
were closed-ended and made in the same way as in
Experiment 1B. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of three experimental conditions: misinformation + no correc-
tion (n = 54), misinformation + correction (n = 56), or no
misinformation + correction (n = 56).
Results
Inference responsesWe found a significant effect of correction
information on references to the target (mis)information for
closed-ended measures (Fig. 4B), F(2, 163) = 26.90, p <
.001, ηp
2 = .25 [.14, .35]. Tukey-adjustedmultiple comparisons
further revealed that the group exposed to misinformation and
its correction, and the group who saw only the correction
6 The recruited number of participants differed from stopping rule specified in
the preregistration. In total, 168 participants were recruited for the closed-
ended condition, due to an error. Ultimately we decided to include the extra
participants in the analysis rather than exclude their data. However, the re-
sponses from two participants were excluded: one because the participant took
the HIT twice, and another because the participant provided nonsense answers
to the open-ended questions at the end of the study.
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Exp 2B: Closed−Ended Factual Responses
d
Correction Information Misinfo + No Corr. Misinfo + Corr. No Misinfo + Corr.
Fig. 4 Effects of correction information on the numbers of (A) references
to the target (mis)information in Experiment 2A, (B) references to the
target (mis)information in Experiment 2B, (C) accurately recalled facts in
Experiment 2A, and (D) accurately recalled facts in Experiment 2B. Error
bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the means. The brackets
represent Tukey multiple comparison tests when the omnibus test was
significant. The dashed lines represent the means for the restricted sample
of participants who did not answer the first critical information recall
question correctly
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without the initial misinformation, made significantly fewer
references to the target (mis)information than did the uncor-
rectedmisinformation condition. The two groupswho received
correction information did not differ significantly.
Factual responses Participants’ responses to the factual ques-
tions also showed a significant effect of correction informa-
tion condition (Fig. 4D), F(2, 163) = 4.70, p = .01, ηp
2 = .05
[.00, .13]. Tukey’s tests revealed that the factual responses
from participants in the condition featuring a correction with-
out the initial misinformation were significantly lower than
those from the group who saw uncorrected misinformation.
The other differences were not significant (ps > .1). A closer
inspection of the individual answers revealed that incorrect
responses for the no misinformation + correction group were
mainly attributable to the question asking about the contents
of the closet before the fire.
Dropout analysis Of the 375 people who started the study,
only 323 fully completed it (dropout rate 13%). Of those
who completed the study, four (1.23%) were excluded prior
to the analysis because they gave nonsense open-ended re-
sponses (e.g., B21st century fox, the biggest movie in
theatre^). The majority of participants who dropped out did
so immediately after entering their worker ID and before being
assigned to a condition (41%). Of the remaining dropout par-
ticipants who were assigned to a condition, 27% were
assigned to one of the open-ended conditions and dropped
out during the first question block. A further 16% were
assigned to one of the closed-ended conditions and dropped
out when asked to answer the open-ended critical information
recall questions. The remaining 14%were assigned to a closed-
ended condition and dropped out as soon as they reached the
first question block. The dropout breakdown suggests that
many people dropped out because they were unhappy about
having to give open-ended responses. Some participants who
were assigned to the closed-ended conditions dropped out
when faced with open-ended questions, despite the fact that the
progress bar showed that they had almost completed the study.
Discussion
Experiments 2A and 2B again showed clear evidence of a
CIE. As in Experiments 1A and 1B, participants continued
to refer to the misinformation after it had been corrected.
Also consistent with the previous two experiments, the effects
of a correction differed slightly across conditions. This time
the reduction in references to the (mis)information was signif-
icant for the closed-ended questions, but not for the open-
ended questions. As we noted earlier, this is consistent with
findings that a correction sometimes reduces references to
misinformation relative to no correction, and sometimes it
does not (Connor Desai & Reimers, 2017; Ecker et al., 2010).
Experiments 2A and 2B also included a novel control con-
dition in which participants were not exposed to the initial
misinformation but were exposed to its correction. Contrary
to expectations, the new condition resulted in a number of
references to the target (mis)information that was statistically
equivalent to that in the group who were exposed to both the
misinformation and its correction. This finding suggests that
the CIEmight not reflect a model-updating failure, but rather a
decontextualized recall process.
General discussion
In four experiments we examined the feasibility of collecting
data on the CIE online, comparing the efficacy of using tradi-
tional open-ended questions versus adapting the task to use
closed-ended questions. For both types of elicitation proce-
dures, we observed clear CIEs: Following an unambiguous
correction of earlier misinformation, participants continued
to refer to the misinformation when answering inferential
questions. As such, these studies provide clear evidence that
both open-ended and closed-ended questions can be used in
online experiments.
The continued-influence effect
Across all four studies we found that participants continued to
use misinformation that had been subsequently corrected.
This occurred even though a majority of participants recalled
the correction. We found mixed results when examining
whether a correction had any effect at all in reducing refer-
ences to misinformation. Experiments using similar designs
have both found (Ecker, Lewandowsky, &Apai, 2011b; Ecker
et al., 2010) and failed to find (Johnson & Seifert, 1994) an
effect of a correction. Overall, we found limited evidence for
an effect of a correction for the open-ended questions, but
substantial evidence for an effect of a correction using
closed-ended questions. For open-ended questions, it appears
that any effect of a correction on reference to misinforma-
tion—at least using this scenario—is relatively small, and
would be hard to detect consistently using the small sample
sizes that have traditionally been used in this area. This may
explain the variability in findings in the literature.
A correction with an alternative explanation appeared (at
least numerically) to be more effective in reducing reliance on
misinformation than a correction alone. Furthermore, given
that Experiment 1B’s results were actually more consistent
with the original finding (Johnson & Seifert, 1994), the differ-
ences between past and present work are most likely unsys-
tematic and therefore unrelated to the online testing environ-
ment or question type.
Finally, with regard to the main results, in Experiments 2A
and 2B we found using a novel condition, that misinformation
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that was only presented as part of a correction had as much of
a continuing influence effect as misinformation presented ear-
ly in a series of statements and only later corrected. This has
both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, it
suggests that—under some circumstances—the CIE may not
be the result of participants’ unwillingness to give up an
existing mental model without an alternative explanation
(Ecker, Lewandowsky, & Apai, 2011b; Ecker, Lewandowsky,
Swire, & Chang, 2011a; Johnson & Seifert, 1994). Instead, it
might be that participants search their memory for possible
causes when asked inferential questions, but fail to retrieve the
information correcting the misinformation.
Open- and closed-ended questions and the CIE
The pattern of results in response to inference questions
was qualitatively very similar across both open and closed
ended questions. This finding is particularly interesting in
light of the fact that responses to open and closed ques-
tions might be supported by different underlying retrieval
processes (Fisher, Brewer, & Mitchell, 2009; Ozuru et al.,
2013; Shapiro, 2006). Crucially, the response options used
in Experiments 1B and 2B required participants to make a
more considered judgment than multiple-choice or yes/no
questions, which may have encouraged recall rather than a
familiarity-based heuristic. It is also interesting that par-
ticipants still referred to the incorrect misinformation de-
spite the fact that another response option was consistent
with the report, although this was not explicitly stated.
Another important observation was that we found an
effect of correction information on responses to closed-
ended factual questions, but not to open questions. The
difference between conditions is significant, because it
was partly attributable to a question that probed partici-
pants’ verbatim memory of the correction. Many partici-
pants in both conditions featuring a correction answered
this question incorrectly, despite the fact that the options
clearly distinguished between the correct and incorrect
answers, given what participants had read. This question
asked what the contents of the closet were before the fire,
so it not hard to see why participants who continued to
rely on the misinformation might have answer this ques-
tion incorrectly. The fact that there were differences be-
tween the conditions highlights the importance of careful-
ly wording questions and response options in order to
avoid bias.
It is also worth noting that floor effects were not ob-
served (i.e., the misinformation was still influential for
both groups that received a correction), despite the fact
that the present study did not include a distractor task and
that participants answered the inference questions directly
after reading the news report (and so, theoretically, should
have had better memory for the report details).
A brief note on the use of closed-ended questions
and response alternatives: There is the possibility that
presenting a closed list of options reminded participants
of the arson materials explanation and inhibited re-
sponses consistent with the oil paint and gas cylinders
explanation. Also, the closed list of options that repeat-
ed the misinformation could have increased its familiar-
ity, making it more likely to be accepted as true (e.g.,
Ecker, Lewandowsky, Swire, & Chang, 2011a). For the
group that received a simple correction, the other op-
tions had not been explicitly stated in the story. These
participants may not have fully read or understood the
question block instructions, and therefore perceived the
task as choosing the option that had appeared in the
story, irrespective of the correction. In contrast, the par-
ticipants in the alternative-explanation group were able
to better detect the discrepancy between the misinforma-
tion and its correction, because of the option alluding to
arson materials. Although the response alternatives pro-
vided a plausible response that was consistent with the
details of the fire story, none of the options made it
possible to rule out that participants just did not consid-
er the correction when responding. The response alter-
natives provided forced the participants to choose one
from among four explanations, which may not have
reflected their understanding of the event, but nonethe-
less was the option that was most consistent with what
they had read. This explanation is also consistent with
previous studies showing that the response options cho-
sen by the researcher can be used by the participants to
infer which information the participant considers rele-
vant (Schwarz et al., 1985; Schwarz et al., 1991).
Open- and closed-ended questions in Web-based
research
As well as looking directly at the CIE, we also exam-
ined the extent to which participants recruited via
Amazon Mechanical Turk could provide high-quality
data from open-ended questions. We found high levels
of diligence—participants typed much more than was
required in order to give full answers to the questions,
they spent more time reading statements than was re-
quired, and—with a small number of exceptions—they
engaged well with the task and attempted to answer the
questions set.
We found that dropout did increase, however, when partic-
ipants had to give open-ended responses. This may suggest
that some participants dislike typing open-ended responses, to
the extent that they choose not to participate. (It could be that
participants find it too much effort, or that they do not feel
confident giving written answers, or that it feels more personal
having to type an answer oneself.) Alternatively, it may be that
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some participants, because of the device they were using,
would struggle to provide open-ended responses, and so
dropped out when faced with open-ended questions. Either
way, it is striking that we had over 4% of the participants in
Experiment 2B who read all the statements and gave answers
to all the closed-ended questions, but then dropped out when
asked to type their responses to the final two critical informa-
tion recall questions. There are ethical implications of having
participants spend 10min on a task before dropping out, so the
requirement for typed answers should be presented promi-
nently before participants begin the experiment.
We found that participants’ recall of the correction for the
misinformation was worse than in previous lab-based studies.
We found that only a little over half of participants across the
conditions in our study correctly reported the correction when
prompted. This figure is poor when compared to the figures of
95% (correction) and 75% (alternative explanation) found in
Johnson and Seifert’s (1994, Exp. 3A) laboratory-based ex-
periment. It is possible that this was the result of poor attention
and recall of the correction, but we believe it was more likely a
response issue, in which participants retained the information
but did not realize that they were being asked to report it when
asked whether they were aware of any inconsistencies or cor-
rections. (In other unpublished research, we have found that
simply labeling the relevant statement BCorrection:^ greatly
increased participants’ reference to it when asked about any
corrections.) Although this did not affect the CIE, in future
research wewould recommendmaking the instructions for the
critical information recall questions particularly clear and ex-
plicit. This advice would, we imagine, generalize to any ques-
tions that might be ambiguous and would require a precise
answer.
In choosing whether to use open-ended questions or
to adapt them to closed-ended questions for use online,
there are several pros and cons to weigh up. Open-
ended questions allow for a consistency of methodology
with traditional lab-based approaches—meaning there is
no risk of participants switching to using different strat-
egies or processes, as they might with closed-ended
questions. We have shown that participants generally
engage well and give good responses to open-ended
questions. It is also much easier to spot and exclude
participants who respond with minimal effort, since
their written answers tend to be nonsense or copied
and pasted from elsewhere. For closed-ended responses,
attention or consistency checks or other measures of
participant engagement are more likely to be necessary.
That said, closed-ended questions are, we have found,
substantially faster to complete, meaning that re-
searchers on a budget could test more participants or
ask more questions; such questions require no time to
manually code; participants are less likely to drop out
with them; and—at least in the area of research used
here—they provide results comparable to those from
open-ended questions.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the continued-influence effect can be added to
the existing list of psychological findings that have been suc-
cessfully replicated online. Data obtained online are of suffi-
ciently high quality to allow examining original research ques-
tions and are comparable to data collected in the laboratory.
Furthermore, the influence of misinformation can be exam-
ined using closed-ended questions with direct choices be-
tween options. Nevertheless, as with any methodological tool,
researchers should proceed with caution and ensure that suf-
ficient piloting is conducted prior to extensive testing. More
generally, the research reported here suggests that open-ended
written responses can be collected via the Web and Amazon
Mechanical Turk.
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